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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to members of Congress receiving letters containing the bacteria
causing anthrax, all mailings to the Copyright Office were irradiated between
October 2001 and May 2002.' Consequently, although Strategy Source, Inc. (SSI)
submitted an application to register its copyright in certain advertising materials
to the Copyright Office, the Copyright Office's processing of SSI's application
was "delayed by up to six months."2 At the time, SSI was engaged in
a lawsuit
3
before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
In their complaint, SSI alleged that their copyright had been infringed-that
the defendants had copied, displayed, and distributed SSI's advertising materials
without permission.' The court held that "a certificate of registration is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to fling an infringement suit in this Court, the only
exception being where the Copyright Office has refused to issue the certificate of
registration." ' In applying that standard to the case at bar, the court refused to
"authoriz[e] suit before registration is achieved," although it acknowledged that
"the plaintiffs attempt to obtain the certificates of registration has been delayed
by the anthrax situation."6 Accordingly, the court dismissed the case without
considering the merits of SSI's complaint.7
What are the potential consequences of dismissal to copyright owners in SSI's
position? At best, they recover their actual damages and the defendants' marginal
profits some six-plus months later after achieving registration.' Having to sit idly
while aware of, but powerless to stop, infringement of their copyrights would be
frustrating, especially if the defendants were intentional infringers who were
willing to risk the chance of later litigation in exchange for immediate gain.
Nonetheless, such copyright owners could take comfort in the fact that, once they
achieved registration, their second suit could potentially address infringement that
occurred before registration.9 On the other end of the spectrum, the worst case
I JAMES

E. 14AwES & BERNARD C. DIETz, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION PRACTICE § 23:7 (2d

ed. 2005).
2 See Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002).
3 Id. at 1.
4 Id.
s Id. at 4.
6

Id.

7 Id. at 5.

8 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000) ('The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages
suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.").
9 See 2 MELViLLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMAER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16[B][1][a]

(2005) ("Once registration takes place, a subsequent infringement action may address infringing acts
that occurred either after or before that registration, provided that the filing of the infringement
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scenario for copyright owners in SSI's position would arise if the alleged
infringement took place over two-and-a-half years prior to the filing of suit. As
suits brought under the Copyright Act must be commenced within three years of
infringement in order to satisfy the statute of limitations, 10 a six-month delay.
would normally result in such owners losing the right to bring suit for relief based
on that infringement."
In SSI's case, the court's decision to dismiss their complaint may seem odd
and perhaps unfair. Even so, it is more accurately characterized as the norm
rather than the exception among federal courts that confront analogous facts. 2
Nonetheless, there is no readily discernible majority approach among federal
courts in this context because many other such courts would allow suit to proceed
in circumstances similar to those of SSI.' 3
Confused as to what events must normally occur in order for copyright
registration to be achieved under federal law? So are the federal courts. 4
A copyright "automatically inheres in a work the moment it is 'created.' ,I5
Complementing this concept, the Copyright Act explicitly provides that
"registration is not a condition of copyright protection."' 6 Accordingly, certain
requirements of the Copyright Act can accurately be described as "inducements

action occurs within the terms set ui the tatutLe of !imitauun, j.
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (2000) ("No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this
tide unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.").
11See BRUCE P. KELLER &JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

§ 11:3.1[B]

(5th ed. 2001) ("The plaintiff can register the claim after dismissal and bring a
[-]owever, the plaintiff faces risks that the statute of limitations has
subsequent action ....
run....'. But see 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a][i] (stating that "some authority" allows
a plaintiff to amend the initial complaint after achieving registration, and that "one court held that
a newly filed complaint would ... relate back to the original filing date for purposes of the statute
of limitations").
12 See infra note 14.
13 See infra note 14.
14 See, e.g., Leora Herrmann, It's Never Too Late: Copyrght Registrationas ajurisictionalPrerequisite
to Suit, IP LITIGATOR, July-Aug. 2005, at 28 (2005) (listing various circuit and district courts that
disagree on the issue of what requirements a copyright owner must meet for a federal court to be
competent to hear an infringement claim-including at least two circuits in which the respective
district courts are at odds); 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a][i] nn.38.21-.22 (listing splits
among, as well as within, various circuits); see alsoRyan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873 FMA, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (acknowledging that district courts within the Tenth
Circuit were split on this issue). Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court ofAppeals addressed that circuit's
respective split in La ResolanaArchitects, PA v. Clay RealtorsAngel Fire,416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
15 2 NIMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[A][1]. "Creation" occurs once a work "is fixed in a copy or
phonorecord for the first time." Id.
16 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000).
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to registration which do not necessarily compromise protection afforded by
copyright."'"
Nonetheless, the Copyright Act also states that "no action for infringement
of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until... registration
of the copyright claim has been made" with the Copyright Office."8 The effect
of this provision is "unequivocal."' 9 Congress has broad authority to determine
the terms on which federal courts may exercise jurisdiction 0 over certain subject
matter.21 Therefore, copyright registration is a condition precedent to the exercise
of subject-matter jurisdiction by federal courts over copyright infringement
claims.' Accordingly, in contrast to ownership of a copyright, the 23ability to
enforce a copyright is conditioned on the achievement of registration.
With respect to differing views among federal courts as to the satisfaction of
that condition, "[t]he dispute boils down to the issue of when a work is
considered 'registered' for purposes of copyright law. '24 In other words, a split
exists among federal courts as to what acts by a copyright owner are sufficient for
copyright registration to be achieved and, thus, for a court to be competent to
adjudicate a copyright infringement suit." Unfortunately, the Act provides little
direct assistance in interpreting this term as it simply states that
"'[r]egistration'... means a registration of a claim in the original or the renewed
and extended term of copyright., 26 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue of what events constitute "registration" sufficient to
allow a federal court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a copyright

'7 Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Depositand Registration: The Importance of Being
Formal, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1232, 1262 (1977).
18 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (emphasis added).
I9 Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1262.
20 Jurisdiction is defined as a "court's power to decide a case or issue a decree." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 867 (8th ed. 2004).
2 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure ofArtice III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 1569

(1990) ("According to [the traditional view of Article III], Congress may deprive the lower federal
courts, the Supreme Court, or all federal courts of jurisdiction over any cases within the federal
judicial power, excepting only those few that fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.").
22 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a].
23 See Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1262 ("A statement that, under the provisions of
chapter 4 [of Tide 17], registration is not a condition of copyright is defensible; the statement that
registration is not a condition of copyright protection is not.').
24 Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 632 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
25 See supra note 14.
26 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416
F.3d 1195, 1200 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (setting the Copyright Act's definition of registration and
concluding that the Act "gives little guidance on how to construe the term').
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infringement claim.27 Thus, no binding authority exists to provide the system of
federal courts with a standard approach to this question.2"
Notwithstanding an apparent lack of guidance from a source of higher
authority, the boundaries of the issue on which federal courts are split can be
defined with some certainty. On one hand, these courts generally agree that
possession of a registration certificate or letter explaining why an application has
been rejected is suffident for achieving registration.29 On the other hand, most
federal courts also agree that submission to the Copyright Office of the requisite
materials-application for copyright registration, deposit, and fee 3 -is necessary
for achieving registration.3' Thus, in practical terms, the essence of the dispute
concerns "what happens [when] suit is filed during the interval after the copyright
owner has duly submitted all the necessary ingredients to the Copyright Office,
'
but before that Office has issued the certificate or denied its issuance."32
When
confronted with this scenario, federal courts disagree as to whether application
to register, though necessary, is also sufficient (application approach) 33 or, to the

' See e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 816 (2004); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 12081 l996 ;
alo Raquel--. Educ. Mgm.. Corp., 196 F.3d 1,, (3d Cir. 1999), er.granied,53
U.S. 952 (2000) (vacated on other grounds).
28 Nonetheless, persuasive secondary authority, particularly Nimmer on Copyright, has had a
profound effect on courts favoring the application approach, which the treatise itself advocates. See
2 NTTMMER, .tapa note 9, 7.16[,B]
.
[l1]j [a3i
scussing the practice of allowing suits to proceed when
a copyright owner has submitted all of the required materials to the Copyright Office but has yet to
receive a reply and opining that such a practice "represents the better point of view").
29 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a][i] (stating that, in the case of a copyright owner
who registers his work before infringement occurs, "filing suit later based on the registration
certificate is straightforward'); see also 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (2000) ("In any case... where the deposit,
application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper
form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for
infringement if notice thereof.., is served on the Register of Copyrights.").
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000) ("[Tlhe owner of [a] copyright... may obtain registration of the
copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together
with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708.").
31 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a][i] ("Absent issuance of a certificate and in the
absence of the copyright owner even having sent the requisite application (together with deposit and
fee) to the Copyright Office, there is plainly a jurisdictional defect....").
32 Id.
3 As an evidentiary matter, courts that favor the application approach require proof that the
Copyright Office has received the necessary application, deposit, and fee. See Apple Barrel Prods.
v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1984) (declaring that "to bring suit for copyright
infringement... [o]ne need only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question,
and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application'). Logistically, this standard has
been satisfied by introducing into the record copies of the copyright application and deposits
submitted to the Copyright Office, as well as a receipt from the Copyright Office indicating that the
copyright owner's application, fee, and deposit had been received. E.g., Wilson v. Mr. Tee's, 855 F.
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contrary, issuance of a Copyright Office response is not only sufficient, but also
necessary (issuance approach).34
As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright claims, 31 the split
among the federal courts over the dictates of the Copyright Act is significant to
every copyright owner who, though not in possession of a certificate of
registration (or letter denying such) at the moment they become aware of
infringement, nonetheless acts to "simultaneously register the[ir] work and seek
judicial redress."36 Such copyright owners often seek to enforce their copyrights
invarious circuits and districts where the allegedinfringer operates 37 and would
benefit from knowing the approach adopted by the court in which the owners
intend to assert their claims. 38 With that knowledge, these copyright owners can
determine the events that must occur in order to achieve registration, confer
competency, and, thus, give substantive effect to their copyrights.39 However, as
the split among and within circuits is widespread and arbitrary, 4 0 copyright owners
are afforded little notice as to whether their efforts to register a copyright will be
sufficient to allow them to immediately seek relief in a court of law for
infringement of that right.
With both individual copyright owners and society-at-large in mind, this Note
will analyze the repercussions of the status quo in which both the issuance and

Supp. 679, 682 (D.N.J. 1994).
See Elke Flores Suber, HandlingPretrialMattersin a Copyrigbt Case, 13 PRAC. LITIGATOR 19, 21
(2002) ("There is a split of authority in the courts regarding whether the Copyright Act requires an
actual registration certificate or merely filing an application."); see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 9,
§ 7.16 [B] [1][a] [i] (contrasting "appicationfor registration" with "issuance of a registrationcertificate').
35SeeKFLLER& CUNARD, supranote 11, S 11:3.1 ("Two provisions create a federal jurisdictional
monopoly over copyright claims: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which provides for exclusive federal
jurisdiction over all claims 'arising under' the Copyright Act, and (2) 17 U.S.C. §301, which preempts
any state law claim that seeks to vindicate rights equivalent to the exclusive rights secured by the
Copyright Act."). But see La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,
1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (declaring that "if'a state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond
mere copying, preparation of derivative works, performance, distribution or display, then the state
cause of action is qualitatively different from, and not subsumed within, a copyright infringement
claim'" (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 847 (10th Cir. 1993))).
36 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a][i].
31See Suber, supra note 34, at 23 ("Generally, an action for copyright infringement may be
instituted in the district where the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.').
38 See id. at 21 ("[Copyright registration] is an important consideration because copyright actions
are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction . . . . [L]itigants must consider the requirements
established in their respective jurisdictions before instituting a copyright case in federal court.').
" See supratext accompanying notes 33-34; see also Rebecca S. Stroder, CopyightRegistration. Get
It Before You Need It, LICENSINGJ., Mar. 2003, at 17 ("Even though a copyright 'springs to life' at the
moment a work is created, that [copyright] has no teeth until the owner has registered the claim with
the Copyright Office.").
0 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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application approaches are employed contemporaneously and haphazardly. This
Note will then seek to determine whether the federal courts should adopt one
approach over the other.
To reach this determination, this Note will begin by summarizing contrasting
concepts of the origin and nature of copyright and examining copyright law's
purposes, which are greatly influenced by the origins of copyright. It will then
consider the formality of copyright registration, focusing in particular .on the
registration procedure, the ends furthered by that procedure, and current
incentives to pursue registration. Finally, this Note will consider legislative
handling of registration as a prerequisite to infringement actions as well as
justifications for the divergent judicial approaches as to when registration has
been achieved.
Based on that analysis, this Note will find that, under both approaches as
presently applied, the general purposes of copyright law are furthered-authors
retain incentives to create and society continues to reap benefits as a result.
Nonetheless, it will argue that little is to be gained by maintaining the status quo
and even less is to be lost by abandoning it. Furthermore, this Note will assert
that the application approach is justified by both the text of the Copyright Act
and underlying policy considerations. Finally, it will argue that considerations of
fairness, practicality, and logical consistency weigh in favor of the application
approach. Accordingly, this Note will conclude that federal courts should
consider registration achieved and, thus, regard themselves competent to
adjudicate copyright infringement claims upon submission of the necessary
materials to the Copyright Office by the copyright owner.
II. BACKGROUND
A. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF COPYRIGHT

1. Nature ofCopyright. A copyright is "a bundle of exclusive rights given to an
author for a limited time that are designed to protect his 'original work of
authorship [that is] fixed in any tangible medium of expression now known or
later developed' from infringing use by others."'"
2. PositivitghtConcept. According to the positivist right concept, a copyright
is exclusively a "product of positive constitutional and legislative authority."4 2
Thus, a copyright exists only if the legislature decides to grant one.4 3 As the

Elise M. Stubbe, CopyrightRegistrationPracticeforthe Non-CopyightAttorny, 52 LA. B.J. 448,448
(2005) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)).
42 Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1232.
41 See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss1/3

8

Bracey: Searching For Substance in The Midst of Formality: Copyright Regi

2006]

SEARCHING FOR SUBSTANCE

legislature represents the citizens, society effectively submits itself to an
individual's right to exclude in this situation and expects some benefit in return.
Under this view, a copyright "may be conditioned upon the imposition of
whatever formal requirements Congress deems appropriate to notify the world
of the precise limits of an author's monopoly.""
3. NaturalRightConcept. In contrast to the positivist right concept, the natural
right concept supposes that a copyright is the "inherent or natural right of an
author to the product of his creative genius."4 Thus, even in the face of
46
legislative inaction, an author secures a copyright in his own creation.
Accordingly, this view asserts that "authors ought to have benefit from their
creations free of cumbersome formalities. 47
B. PURPOSES OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW

The Copyright Clause grants the power to Congress to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ...the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings. '' 48 On its face, the text indicates that
"the public's interest [is] equal, if not superior, to the author's. '49 In fact, the
Supreme Court has declared that although the "immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor .... the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."5
In light of both the Constitutional text as well as the Supreme Court's
explication of the purpose of copyright law, copyrights in the United States are
properly characterized as products of positive constitutional authority.5 1 Thus,

concurring) (describing a copyright as "a right which could not be recognized or endured for more
than a limited time... it is one which can hardly be conceived except as a product of statute..
quoted in Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1232-33 n.8.
4 Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1233.
45 Id.
See id at 1233 n.10 (stating that the natural right concept "presupposes the existence of rights
inherent in man, which should require no positive, legislative act to be secured"). Natural rights are
distinct from moral rights, which "protect an author's interest in his reputation and in the integrity
of his works." Id
47 Id.at 1233.
4' U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8.
41Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tak of Two Copyrights: Literaty Property in Revolutionay FranceandAmeica,
64 TUL L. REv. 991, 992 (1990).
o Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,156 (1975).
5'See Levine & Squires, smpra note 17, at 1233-34 (stating that ever since the United States
Supreme Court first dealt with the subject of copyrights in Wheaton v. Peters, 3 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591
(1834), "the characterization of American copyright law as a creature of the Constitution and the
legislature has not been subject to serious dispute").
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Congress would appear free to impose formalities,5 2 or "state-imposed conditions
on the existence or exercise of copyright." 3 As an example, dictating that a
copyright owner "register and deposit copies of the work with a government
agency, before the right will be... enforced is fully consistent with a publicbenefit [or positivistic right] view of copyright."' Nonetheless, such formalities
may, among other effects, reduce an author's incentive to create. 5 Accordingly,
the willingness of courts to enforce certain copyright formalities may be tempered
by countervailing considerations, particularly of fairness to authors. s6
C. COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION GENERALLY

1. The RegistrationProcedure. To register a copyright, the copyright owner must
submit three items: a completed application, a deposit of the work itself, and a
fee, which currently stands at thirty dollars.57 The applications are available online
and may be completed in PDF form." Since the Copyright Office receives more
than 600,000 applications a year, approximately four to five months usually pass
before the evaluation is completed. 9 Once the Copyright Office approves an
application, the registration is effective as of the date on which the Copyright
Office received the last of the requisite materials.' °
The Copyright Office does offer an expedited procedure known as "special
handling."6' For applicants with "truly compelling reasons for expedited issuance
of a certificate of registration"-including when registration bears on prospective
62
or pending litigation, the option of special handling is available by request.
However, assuming the Copyright Office grants such a request, a special handling
fee, currently set at $580, must be paid.63

52

See supra text accompanying note 44.

s Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 994.
4 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1236 n.21 ("In many instances the courts have
protected rights creators asserted in their works against claims of forfeiture for failure to comply with
the precise letter of statutory formalities.").
17 KELLER & CUNARD, supranote 11, § 5:3.2[A]; see also supra note 30 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)
(2000)).
8 Stubbe, supra note 41, at 449.
19 KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 11, § 5:3.3.
o 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2000).
61 KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 11, § 5:3.2[E].
62 Id
63 Id
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Although "copyright registrations are issued in response to approximately
96.4% of the applications submitted each year,"" an applicant's fate is not sealed
if the Copyright Office ultimately refuses to register his copyright.65 Generally,
two procedures of review are available: suits against the Register of Copyrights
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or infringement suits under the
Copyright Act.6 6 With respect to the latter, the Copyright Act allows the Register
to intervene in copyright suits concerning registration.67
2. Puposesof Registration. Copyright registration enables the Copyright Office
"to enforce compliance with the law as a condition of obtaining the grant of
exclusivity in works subject to copyright. '61 Consequently, information contained
inboth the application and deposit is "generally considered to be of reasonably
high quality. '69 Nonetheless, the Copyright Office examination normally
"involves no assessment of entitlement beyond the contents of the application
form and the deposit."7 Thus, the gatekeeper role of the Copyright Office is
limited.7'
Copyright registration also allows the Copyright Office to serve as a
"clearinghouse for copyright information on works in circulation. '72
Consequently, market transactions concerning copyrights are made more efficient
because sellers have a public record of their property right and buyers have access
to information that can be utilized to identify and contact potential sellers.73
Additionally, the exploitation of copyrighted works is encouraged not only

Laurie A. Haynie, So the Copyigbt Office has Refused to Rgster Your Claim to Copyright-What Does
it Mean and Wrhat Can You Do About It?, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 70, 71 (1993).
65 Id. at 74.
66

Id

67

See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (2000) ("The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the

action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by entering an appearance
within sixty days after... service, but the Register's failure to become a party shall not deprive the
court of jurisdiction to determine that issue.").
Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1254.
69 John B. Koegel, Bamboozement: The Repeal of CopyrightRegistrafion Incentives, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 529, 539-40 (1995).
70 Levine & Squires, supranote 17, at 1254; see also KmE.LLR & CUNARD, supra note 11, § 5:3.3[q
(declaring that the Copyright Office "does not conduct an exhaustive search of its records in an
effort to thwart plagiarists').
71 See Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1254 ("The enforcement of the substantive provisions
of Copyright law by the Copyright Office is ...limited.').
72 KELLER & CUNARD, supranote 11, § 5:1.
" See Levine & Squires, supranote 17, at 1254 ("The maintenance of a complete public record
is vital to a functioning marketplace for the transfer of rights in copyrighted works and,
concomitantly, their exploitation in both original and derivative forms.").
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because users have notice of registered works not to copy, 4 but also because their
potential financial liability for use of unregistered works is kept in check.7"
Lastly, copyright registration "facilitate[s] the growth of the Library of
Congress's collection of published and unpublished works."76 This expansion, in
turn, allows for the "development and growth of a national collection of the
country's creative product and culture."77 Obtained without significant expense
to taxpayers,7 8such a collection benefits the government, the public, and future
generations.
3. Beyond Jurisdiction: Other Incentives to Register. The Copyright Act
affirmatively establishes that the arising and continued existence of a copyright is
not dependent upon its registration.79 In fact, § 408(a) is titled, "Registration
Permissive.' Nonetheless, beyond providing that a court's competency depends
on registration, the Copyright Act provides ample incentive for authors to register
their copyrights.8
a. PrimaFade Validiy of Copyright. First, the Copyright Act provides that
a registration certificate "shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright., 82 Possession of a registration certificate also serves as prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts asserted within the certificate itself.8 3 Thus,
registration secures an "evidentiary advantage."'
b. Statutory Damages andAttorny'sFees. The Copyright Act also conditions
the award of attorney's fees and statutory damages upon the registration of a
copyright prior to commencement of the infringement at issue.8 ' As "typically the

14 See Koegel, supra note 69, at 539 ("[S]ince assignments of copyright ownership and other
transfers are registered, a member of the public can readily trace ownership to its current holder.").
7 See Shira Perlmutter, FreeingCopyghtFromiFormatze, 13 CARDOZO ARTS&ENT.LJ. 565, 576

(1995) (discussing the effects of potentially repealing the registration requirement and declaring that
"users of copyrighted works will no longer be able to rely on a lack of registration to signify that
their potential financial exposure in a lawsuit will be limited').
16 KELLER& CUNARD, supra note 11, § 5:1.
77 Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1254.
78 See Koegel, supranote 69, at 533, 543 (discussing the deposit requirement and noting both that
"the general public and the government have been enormously benefited by the breadth and depth
of [the Library of Congress collection]" and that this collection is "preserve[d] ... for future
generations to study and learn from").
7 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000)); see also Levine
& Squires, supranote 17, at 1262 (stating that "failure to register... cannot, under the New Act,
cause the copyright to be invalidated").
o 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000).
sI See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
12 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000).
83 Id

4 Haynie, supra note 64, at 72.

85 See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2000) ("In any action under this tide, other than [three narrow
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copyright owner cannot prove actual damages .. and provable, substantial profits
are the exception rather than the rule," 6 statutory damages "may often constitute
the only meaningful remedy available to a copyright owner for infringement of his
work.""7 With regard to attorney's fees, a copyright owner hoping to bring an
infringement suit may need "tens of thousands of dollars in disposable income
to cover legal fees .. . [and a] contingency fee arrangement will rarely be
satisfactory." 8 Accordingly, conditioning the award of attorney's fees and
statutory damages on registration prior to infringement serves as a major incentive
for owners to register their copyright.8 9
D. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION AS A CONDITION
TO THE EXERCISE OF SUBJECT-MATTERJURISDICTION

Copyright registration has served as a "prerequisite to the commencement of
an action for infringement ...essentially... since 1790."90 Over 200 years later,
"this procedural requirement survives as an integral aspect of U.S. copyright
law."9' Nonetheless, when examined in light of the treatment of other formalities,
both domestically and abroad, the subtle evolution of the registration requirement
as traced through the major revisions of American copyright law is especially
92
informative.

exceptions] ...no award of statutory damages or of attorney's fees, as provided by sections 504 and
505, shall be made for-) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced
before the effective date of its registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after
first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration
is made within three months after the first publication of the work."); see also Koegel, supranote 69,
at 534 ("Section 412 limits the availability of awards of statutory damages and attorney's fees to those
copyright holders who register their work prior to the particular infringement that is the subject of
the lawsuit.").
s Perlmutter, supranote 75, at 574.
87 2 NIMMR, supra note 9, § 7.16[C][1].
88 Perlmutter, supranote 75, at 573-74.
89 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[C][1] ("Section 412 represents a powerful incentive to
register, even though nonregistration does not result in invalidation of the copyright.").
o Koegel, supra note 69, at 529.
91Id.
92 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 9, ch. OV ("The ages of American copyright law are accordingly
four: 1.BeforeJuly 1,1909, the effective date of the 1909 Act... 2. From July 1,1909 untilJanuary
1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act... 3. From January 1, 1978 until March 1, 1989, the
effective date of the [Beme Convention Implementation Act] ...4. From March 1, 1989 through
the present."); see general# id. ch. TL (laying out a timeline of dates that are significant to U.S.
copyright law, beginning with the 1909 Act and including October 28, 1998, the effective date of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
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1. CopynightAct of 1790. Drawing on the enumerated authority granted to
them by the Constitution, the first Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1790.9'
This initial Copyright Act "was similar in significant respects to the English law
that preceded it."' 4 Although its scope was expanded throughout the nineteenth
century," this initial copyright statute maintained its essential effect for over a
century. 96 Throughout that period, "recordation of a claim to copyright and
deposit of a copy [was] a prerequisite to having copyright protection in thefirst
place."97 Thus, along with the ability to enforce a copyright, the initial arising of
a copyright was conditioned upon compliance with formalities."
2. Copyright Act of 1909. Following the turn of the century, the formative
copyright statute was altered extensively by the Copyright Act of 1909.9 As a
result, the existence of a copyright was no longer conditioned on compliance with
formalities."
Nonetheless, "registration was still mandatory and acceptance of
registration by the Copyright Office was required before a lawsuit for
infringement could proceed.' 0' Thus, "failure to obtain a registration certificate
from the Copyright Office was fatal."' 2 Therefore, the ability to enforce a

" Seeid.ch. OV ("The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress
to enact copyright legislation. Acting on that power, the very first Congress began federal copyright
protection in 1790."). For the original statute's text, see Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
94 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

321 (3d ed. 2003). For example, the Copyright Act of 1790, "like the Statute of Anne, granted
protection for authors for 14 years, and allowed renewal for 14 more years." Id
9' See id. at 321 (explaining that this expansion took place through both statutory amendments
and court decisions and encompassed the addition of prints, musical compositions, plays,
photographs, artistic works, and sculpture).
9'See id.at 322 ('The most significant overhaul of the Copyright Act since its founding occurred
in 1909.').
9' Koegel, supra note 69, at 533 (emphasis added).
98 See Levine & Squires, supranote 17, at 1253 ("[E]arly American copyright statutes apparendy
envisaged registration and deposit concurrent with initial publication as a true condition to a valid

copyright.... .').

9 See supra note 96.
See Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1253-54 ("Registration and deposit were under [the
1909 Act] ...conditions only to the institution of suit for enforcement of copyright.').
10' Koegel, smpra note 69, at 533. The relevant provision declared that "[n]o action or proceeding
shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this Act with
respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with."
Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078; see also
2 NIMMER, supra note 9,
§ 7.16[B][1][b][i] (stating that "maintained" was construed "to prevent institution as well as
maintenance of an infringement action in the absence of such procedural preliminaries" (citation
omitted)).
1022 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][b][i]. But see Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1261
n.196 ("Under [the 1909 Act], one seeking to enforce a copyright for which registration had been
refused must successfully bring a mandamus action against the Register of Copyrights to compel
'0
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copyright was conditioned on compliance with the necessary formalities, as
determined by the Copyright Office. °3
The 1909 Act also introduced the special remedies of attorney's fees and
statutory damages. 1 4 However, registration of one's copyright prior to
infringement was not a condition of invoking those remedies.'
Finally, as the
1909 Act retained earlier formalities, it placed the United States in conflict with
the increasing number of countries adhering to the Berne Convention.0 6
3. Copyright Act of 1976. After multiple attempts to reform the 1909 Act,
Congress finally succeeded with the Copyright Act of 1976.07 With regard to
registration as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, the 1976 Act "was designed such that
Section 411(a) 'restates' the law as it existed under the 1909 Act."' 0 8 However,
one modification was made in this context, as under the 1976 Act, the Copyright
Office's refusal to register a copyright no longer deprived a court of jurisdiction
over an infringement claim related to the rejected copyright. 09
Additionall,y under the 1976 Act, "the system of registration [was] made
voluntary.""' To encourage participation in this voluntary scheme, "Congress
determined that copyright holders should receive the unusual remedies of
statutory damages and attorney's fees only if their works were registered before
they were infringed.""' Ultimately, "[tihe overall goal of the changes in the law
[under the 1976 Act] was to make registration an optional rather than mandatory
system, encouraged by the carrot of 'special remedies' rather than impelled by the
stick of loss of rights.""' 2
Notwithstanding such a purpose, although
"[r]egistration and deposit requirements under the 1976 Act var[ied] technically

registration prior to instituting an action for infringement.").
103

See supra text accompanying note 101.

" See Koegel, supra note 69, at 534 (discussing the "availability of awards of statutory damages

and attorney's fees" and noting that "these special remedies were introduced into the copyright law
in 1909').
105 See Perlmutter, supra note 75, at 568 (discussing the effects of
the 1976 Copyright Act and
noting that "the availability of [statutory damages and attorney's fees] was for the first time
conditioned on registration before the infringement took place" (emphasis added)).
106 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 94, at 322 ("The 1909 Act kept the formalities that the 1790
Act had established, placing the United States at odds with the growing number of countries that
had adopted the Berne Convention and abandoned formality-notice and registration-in copyright

protection.').
107 id.
1002 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][b][ii].
o See supra note 29 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a)).
Koegel, supra note 69, at 533.

11

m Id. at 534.
Perlmutter, supra note 75, at 569.

12
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from those under the old law... [t]he substance of the requirements... [was]
largely unchanged.""13
4. Berne Convention ImplementationAct. Enacted in 1988, the Berne Convention
Implementation Act (BCIA) amended the Copyright Act of 1976 in order to bring
U.S. copyright law in line with the requirements of the Berne Convention, "an
international copyright agreement signed by numerous countries."' 4 On one
hand, the Berne Convention declared that "the enjoyment and the exercise of
[copyright] shall not be subject to any formality.""'
On the other, the Berne
Convention provided that" 'loss of copyright' is the standard for gauging whether
a prohibited formality exists.""' 6 Thus, decidingwhether to retain the requirement
of registration as a prerequisite to an infringement action was difficult." 7
Initially, the Senate favored abolishing the registration prerequisite to
infringement actions. 18 However, the House objected due to a belief "that
registration 'promotes efficient litigation,' 'narrows the issues that must be
litigated,' ensures that there is a 'central, public record of copyright claims' and
forestalls efforts to 'exert control over.., public domain' materials.""' 9 As a
compromise, the BCIA established a two-tier system in which works that
originated in Berne member countries (other than the United States) were
exempted from the registration prerequisite while works that were created in the
United States (or "nations that have treaty relations with the United States but do
2
12
not adhere to the Berne Convention"' remained subject to that requirement.' 1
5. Digtal Millennium Copyright Act. In 1998, Congress enacted the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).2 2 Although the DMCA provided that all
works by United States citizens were subject to the registration requirement,
regardless of country of publication, 123 it provided that all non-citizens (Berne
members or not) were exempt from that requirement. 2 4 Thus, the DMCA

Levine & Squires, supra note 17, at 1263.
MERGES ET AL., supra note 94, at 322.
115 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(2),July 24,1971,
113
14

25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, quotedin 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][b][h].
16 2 NIA.tER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][b][iii] (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 41 (1988)).
117 See id. (noting that the BCIA "resulted from an extensive legislative debate").
11' 2 NIAD&ER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][b][iii].
"' KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 11, § 5:3.1 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-09, at 41-42 (1988)).
120 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B] [1][b] [iii] n.47.
121 Id. S 7.16[B][1][b][iii].
122 Id. ch. TL.
12 Id. § 7.16[B][1][c].
124 See id. (noting that, in contrast to the law under the BCIA, under the MDCA, "[wlorks by U.S.
citizens remain subject to the registration requirement... [b]ut all others are released" from that
requirement); see also supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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"expanded the no-registration-required zone."' 5 In the process, Congress "lost
sight of the goal" of subjecting all copyright owners to the jurisdictional
prerequisite of registration, "relax[ing] that requirement solely with respect to
Berne claimants.' 26
III. JUDICIAL HANDLING: THE ISSUANCE APPROACH V. THE
APPLICATION APPROACH
A. THE ISSUANCE APPROACH

Some federal courts of appeals have favored the issuance approach. 127 In
128
addition, numerous federal trial courts have reached the same conclusion.
Justification for the issuance approach is based on construing the text of the
Copyright Act and complementing the product of such.statutory construction
with underlying policy considerations.
1. Text of the CopyigbtAct. The "plain meaning" drawn from the text of the
29
Copyright Act provides the primary support for the issuance approach.
Utilizing this fundamental precept of statutory construction along with
others-particularly, the resolution of ambiguities in favor of internal
consistency-courts favoring the issuance approach (issuance-approach courts)
construct a logical argument in support of their conclusion. In the process, the
main focus rests on three statutory provisions: §§ 411,410, and 408.
a. Section 411. The second clause of§ 411(a) states in part: "[Where the
deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the
Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant
is entitled to institute an action for infringement if notice... is served on the

125 2

NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B] [1] [c].
id.
'27
La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,1200 (10th Cir. 2005);

126

Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325,1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affid, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993);
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488-89 (11th Cir. 1990).
128 E.g., Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 368 (D. Md. 2005); Harvard Apparatus,
Inc. v. Cowen, 130 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164 (D. Mass. 2001); Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp.
1238,1241 (D.S.C. 1992); see also Int'l Trade Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 402, 403 (Cl.
Ct. 1982).
129 See, e.g., Mays &_Assocs., 370 F. Supp. 2d at 370 ("This Court finds that the plain language of
the Copyright Act, reflecting sound public policy, requires registration of a copyright or denial of
same as jurisdictional prerequisites to instituting an action for copyright infringement."); Loree
Rodkin Mgmt., Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("[T]he
court agrees ... that the plain language of the Copyright Act unambiguously mandates the actual
issuance of a registration certificate before a copyright action is brought.").
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Register of Copyrights."' 3 ° As this provision employs "application" alongside
"registration," one issuance-approach court reasoned that "the term applicaton...
is clearly something separate and apart from registration."''3 1 In addition, that
court emphasized that the clause outlines "the process of seeking registration...
without labeling this process as registration for purposes of Section 411 (a)."' 32
Another issuance-approach court concluded that § 411(a) necessarily
distinguishes "the act of delivering the deposit, application and fee... [from] the
determination of refusal of copyright registration."'3 As further support for this
distinction, the court noted that an application can be delivered and yet
registration can still be refused. 3 4 Furthermore, another issuance-approach court
noted that "[i]nteipreting the Act to require a certificate prior to bringing an
infringement action gives effect to the requirements for bringing a claim upon
rejection of the copyright application."' 35 Thus, for § 411 (a) to remain internally
consistent, issuance-approach courts conclude that application and registration are
distinct events.
b. Section 410. In addition to § 411, various provisions of § 410 provide
textual support for the issuance approach. 36 Subsection (a) states in relevant part:
"When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that.., the
material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other
legal and formal requirements of this tide have been met, the Register shall
137
register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration."'
Consequently, three "affirmative acts by the Register-to 'examine,' to 'register,'
and then to 'issue' the certificate of registration'"--are required. 36

17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000).
t Mays &Assocs., 370 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
132 Id. at 368.
133 Lorre Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
13o

" See id. (proclaiming that § 411 (a) "drives an ironwedge between the act of delivering the deposit,
application and fee to the Copyright Office and the determination of refusal of copyright registration
by the Register of Copyrights").
"' Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 (EDL), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15321,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002); see also Mays &Assocs., 370 F. Supp. 2d at 368-69 (implying that a
distinction between registration and application is necessary to justify Congress' explicit "provi[sion]
for a course of action to allow suit when the Copyright Office takes action and denies an applicant's
registration"). See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) for the full text of the provision authorizing such a course of
action.
136 See, e.g., Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[T]he Court is in
agreement with those courts that take the view that a certificate of registration is a jurisdictional
The language of section 411(a) is clear and unambiguous. So to [sic] is the
prerequisite ....
language of subsections 410(a) and (b).").
137 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2000).
138 La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
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In light ofCsuch
one issuance-approach
o p ydistinctions,
r ght
,,139court concluded that "the
Copyright Office, not the applicant, registers a claim." 3 Furthermore, as another
issuance-approach court noted, the Copyright Office is "expressly require[d] ...
[to] register a claim... after examining the deposited material and determining that
it constitutes copyrightable subject matter•
In ight of this necessary sequence,
"examination is a prerequisite to registration."' 4' Accordingly, some issuanceapproach courts conclude that "the phrase 'register a claim' cannot possibly refer
to the pre-examination receipt by the Copyright Office of the applicant's fee,
deposit, and application."' 42
Progressing through § 410, subsection (b) states: "In any case in which the
Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material deposited does not
constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other
reason, the Register shall refuse registration.' 4'
As "the flip side to the
requirement that the material be examined before registration,"'" this provision
requires that, in order to refuse registration (as to allow registration), "an
affirmative act by the Copyright Office disallowing registration" is necessary.'45
If registration was effected upon receipt of an application, then no opportunity
would exist for the Copyright Office to affirmatively act to refuse registration.
Thus, issuance-approach courts conclude that registration must be affected at
46
some point following receipt of the application and corresponding materials.
Lastly with regard to § 410, subsection (d) states that "[t]he effective date of
a copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which
are later determined by the Register ... to be acceptable for registration, have all
been received in the Copyright Office.' 47 Some issuance-approach courts
interpret this provision of a "relation-back effect of registration" to serve
purposes other than "mak[ing] application the jurisdictionally critical event."' 48

139Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873 FMS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June
15, 1998).
140Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (C.D. Cal.
2004).

141 Ryan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *5.
142

Loree Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1055; see also Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., No. 96 Civ.

4849, 1996 WL 663880, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1996) ("Section 410(a)'s requirement of
,examination' would be meaningless if filing and registration were synonymous.").
143

17 U.S.C. § 410(b) (2000).

144 La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
145

Id.

14 See, e.g., Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that the

"language of section 410(b) is further reason to reject plaintiff's position" that registration was

effected upon application).
147

17 U.S.C. §410(d).

141La ResolanaArchitects,416 F.3d at 1204 n.9; see also Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons,
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Among others, such purposes include: the term of copyright registration,' 49 the
statute of limitations,' and the possibility of receiving "certain remedies ...
available to a plaintiff only if the infringement occurred after the effective date of
registration."'' Accordingly, these courts view § 410(d) as servingpurposes other
than simply requiring that a copyright be registered upon receipt of an application.
c. Section 408. Some courts have also drawn support for the issuance
approach from the first clause of § 408(a), which states: "mT1he owner of a
copyright... my obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the
Copyright Office the deposit ... application and fee."' 2 In light of examination
being a precondition to registration according to § 410(a), one issuance-approach
court concluded that § 408(a) "envisions substantive review of the material by the
Register of Copyrights. 15 3 For the contrary to be true, another issuanceapproach court reasoned that "the verb would be 'shall obtain' " rather than the
conditional "may obtain. ' ' 1 14 Accordingly, "section 408(a) must be read to mean
merely that the delivery of the application is a step the applicant must take, not
that delivery is sufficient by itself to obtain a registration."'5 5
In the view of issuance-approach courts, the Copyright Act distinguishes, as
a matter of both grammar and logic, between the act of applying for registration
of a copyright and the occurrence of copyright registration. Consequently, the
performance of the former does not affect the same result as the accomplishment
of the latter."5 6 As copyright registration is a condition precedent for the exercise
of subject-matter jurisdiction, issuance-approach courts find that competency to
hear an infringement case is conditioned on more than merely applying for
copyright registration. Accordingly, they conclude that the issuance of a

Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C.D. Ca. 2004) (agreeing that § 410(d) does not mean that a
copyright is registered upon application).
149 La ResolanaArchitects, 416 F.3d at 1204 n.9.
o See Mays & Assocs., Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369 (D. Ma. 2005) (stating that
§ 410(d) "essentially 'backdates' registration to the day when the Copyright Office received a
complete application for purposes of the statute of limitations").
" Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873 FMS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June
15, 1998); see also Strategy Source, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (dismissing the complaint, but stating that the
defendants continue to act "at their peril" because, assuming later registration, the plaintiff's
remedies "will relate back to the date when the application was filed').
152 17 U.S.C. 408(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
153 La ResolanaArchitects, 416 F.3d at 1201.
154 Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
155 Rjan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *7.
156 Although applying for copyright registration, in and of itself, is insufficient to confer subjectmatter jurisdiction according to issuance-approach courts, general agreement exists that such is a
necessary step in the process. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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registration certificate or denial of the same is necessary for the presence of
subject-matter jurisdiction." 7
2. Underlying Poligy Considerations. Although the statutory text is the principal
justification for the issuance approach, courts favoring this approach reinforce
their construction of the Copyright Act with policy considerations underlying the
statute."5 8 Regarding the judicial branch's respective role in "managing" the
registration of copyrights, a basis of reasoning in support of the issuance
approach is provided by the intersection of two fundamental doctrines: judicial
restraint and judicial economy.
a. JudidalRestraint. In general terms, the Constitution grants the judicial
and legislative branches of the federal government defined roles to play in the
management of public affairs-the former to interpret and apply laws, the latter
to enact and amend laws.' 59 The exercise of judicial restraint involves courts
fulfilling their respective function without encroaching upon the role of the
legislature. 6 ' Consequently, issuance-approach courts buttress their "plain
language" construction of the Copyright Act by embracing the principle that
courts should defer to the legislature.
Issuance-approach courts defer to the legislature by applying their statutory
construction of the Copyright Act while leaving the resolution of questionable
secondary effects to Congress. Despite "recogniz[ing] that construing the statute
[in favor of the issuance approach] leads to an inefficient and peculiar result," one
issuance-approach court declared that "[e]ven if Congress were to enact an
illogical or ill-advised law, where Congress' intent is clear, the Court is not free to
redraft statutes to make them more sensible or just.' 16 1 Another of these courts
concluded that "[i] f extraordinary circumstances can be a vehicle for bypassing the

's See Techniques, Inc. v. Rohn, 592 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 411(a) ...it has been held repeatedly that ownership of a copyright Registration is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an action for infringement.").
15' Policy is defined as "[t]he general principles by which a government is guided in its
management of public affairs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).
159 KATHIAEEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

343 (15th ed.

2004).
160 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (8th ed. 2004) (defining judicial restraint as a "philosophy
of judicial decision-making whereby judges avoid indulging their personal beliefs about the public
good and instead try merely to interpret the law as legislated and according to precedent").
161 Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873 FMS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal.
June 15,1998); see also
Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1,4 (D.D.C. 2002) ("To conclude
that registration or the refusal of registration by the Copyright Office are not jurisdictional
prerequisites is to disregard the plain language of these statutes and to in effect re-write them, which
as a judge, this Court cannot do.").
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registration requirement before filing suit, it is Congress that must address the
'
situation, not the courts. ' 162
Additionally, these courts defer to the legislature by hypothesizing possible
relationships between the purpose of certain provisions of the Copyright Act and
the means adopted to accomplish such. One issuance-approach court stated:
"Apparently, Congress concluded when it enacted section 411(a) that vetting by
the Copyright Office of claims . .. to copyright protection was a necessary
prerequisite to federal courts exercising jurisdiction. ' 163 Another such court
found it "not illogical for Congress to condition the remedies of the Act to those
who register.... Congress could very reasonably have concluded that these rights
and remedies are the 'carrot' to induce registration and the 'stick' is the lack of
federal court jurisdiction until registration is accomplished."' 6
b. Judicial Economy. In addition to its compatibility with the federal
government's overall system of checks and balances, the issuance approach also
draws support from its effect within the judicial branch of furthering the efficient
use of judicial resources. One issuance-approach court concluded that, if the
issuance approach was not employed, a great deal of uncertainty would be
generated by "shifting legal entitlements"-in particular, the presumption of
validity which accompanies a registered copyright.' That court reasoned that if
"an applicant could obtain the advantage of the presumption that the copyright
is valid upon application, but then, after examination the Register of Copyrights
determined the material166is not copyrightable, the presumption of validity would
swing back and forth.'
By refusing to exercise jurisdiction until the Copyright Office has registered
or rejected a party's application, issuance-approach courts view themselves as
providing parties with a more dependable view of the merits of their legal
positions.16 Consequently, litigants are better able to evaluate their odds of

162

Strategy Source, 233 F. Supp. 2d, at 4. But see Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78

(D.R.I. 2003) (declaring that "it would be wholly inequitable to require that [the plaintiff], prior to
proceeding with this action, register a copyright in images to which [the defendant] presently denies
him access").
163 Strategy Source, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 4.
164 La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204-05 (10th Cir.
2005).
165

La Resolana Arhitects, 416 F.3d at 1205; see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, 5 7.16[B][1][a][i]

n.38.19a (discussing a court's ruling that "application alone suffices for a presumption [of validity]
to arise," declaring that such "accord[s] a presumption that could later evaporate," and concluding
that it would be "[b]etter ... to deny that a presumption arises until such time as the certificate
issues'.
166 La ResolanaArrhitects,416 F.3d at 1205 (citation omitted).
167 See id. at 1205 (stating that the effects of the application approach "would generate uncertainty
in copyright litigation that the Act was designed to moderate" immediately prior to holding that the
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success at trial and, thus, less likely to consume judicial resources in a losing
effort. Accordingly, these resources are preserved for more valuable use in
instances where a clear legal dispute exists.
Ultimately, a substantial number of federal courts have held that the Copyright
Act requires a decision by the Copyright Office to either register or refuse to
register a copyright prior to a court determining itself competent to hear an
infringement claim. 6 ' , Although the level of detail in which issuance-approach
courts explain their reasoning varies from one to the other, virtually all rely
primarily on the text of the Copyright Act. Complementing their interpretation
with underlying policy considerations, issuance-approach courts find that the
legislative intent underlying the Copyright Act is both clear and justifiable. Thus,
such courts conclude that the issuance approach is the most appropriate course
to follow.
B. THE APPLICATION APPROACH

Some federal appellate courts adhere to the application approach.1 69 Many trial
courts at the federal level also favor this conclusion.' ° Generally, support for the
application approach is drawn from construing the text of the Copyright Act with
underlying policy considerations in mind.
1. Text ofCopyrightAac. In similar fashion to issuance-approach courts, courts
favoring registration upon application (application-approach courts) claim to
interpret the Copyright Act based on its "plain meaning.'1'71 To "discern
congressional intent,'' 171these courts look to various provisions of the Copyright
Act, including % 408, 410, and 411.
a. Section 408. A number of application-approach courts "rely on the
language of [the second clause of] § 408, that registration is not a condition of

Tenth Circuit adheres to the issuance approach).
168 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
169 Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.N.J. 1987),
vacated on othergrounds, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988); Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384,
387 (5th Cir. 1984); c.Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345,1349 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding
court competent to hear request for permanent injunction in absence of registration of work at
issue).
170 E.g., Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630,634 (M.D.N.C. 2004); WellMade Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Wilson v. Mr.
Tee's, 855 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D.N.J. 1994).
171 See Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003) (focusing on the "plain
language" of §410 of the Copyright Act); see
also Iconbazaar,308 F. Supp. 2d at 633 ("[C]ourts should
begin with the words of the statute and give the words their common meaning.").
172 Iconbazaar 308 F. Supp. at 634.
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copyright protection."' 7 3 Implicitly, these courts appear to take "copyright
protection" at its face value,' 74 as they construe that term to encompass the ability
to prevent injury to a copyright rather than to merely convey legal recognition of
the validity of a copyright. 7 ' Since the only means, plausibly considered by
issuance-approach courts, of preventing such injury would be judicial
enforcement of a copyright, these courts must infer from § 408(a) that the
issuance of a certificate of registration or a denial of the same is not needed in
order for a court to be competent to enforce a party's copyright. 76
Courts favoring the application approach also draw support from the first
clause of § 408(a). 77 In contrast to the tacit interpretation of the first clause of
§ 408 by issuance-approach courts,"' some application-approach courts interpret
"may" as a permissive command rather than as a conditional command.'
In
other words, these latter courts conclude that, by delivering the appropriate
deposit, application, and fee, copyright owners effect registration.' 0
b. Section 410. Although § 410(a). 8' is focused on by issuance-approach
courts, 8 2 some application-approach courts have concluded that this provision

173La-Resnca-- A
,- PA v. Clay Realtorsi ngel F;, 416 F.3d 1195, 12031,10th Cir. 2005).
Before ultimately holding in favor of the issuance approach, the La Resolana court laid out the
competing "[i]nterpretations of the [p]lain [l]anguage of the [s]tatutes." Id.at 1201-05. The second
and final clause' (900M1f1"
of § 408(a) states that "registration is not a condition of copyright protection." 17
11

C. 6aAOA(

Protection is defined as "[tihe condition of being protected." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 995 (2d College ed. 1991). Protect, in turn, is defined as "[t]o keep from harm, attack,
or injury; guard." I.
175 See, e.g., Datatel, Inc. v. Rose & Tuck, L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 05-495, 2005 WL 1668020, at *9
(E.D. VaJune 17,2005) (finding that the plaintiff "has standing to raise copyright claims even if [the
plaintiff] has not yet received certificate of registration from the Copyright Office" immediately prior
to quoting § 408(a) and declaring that "[sluch registration [as addressed in § 408(a)] is not a condition
of copyright protection").
176 See, e.g., id.; see also Foraste,248 F. Supp. 2d at 76, 77 n.10 (noting the plaintiff's reliance on
408(a) before rejecting the "statutory reading" offered by issuance-approach courts).
177 See supra text accompanying note 152 (quoting the relevant portion of 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)).
178 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
179 See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630,634 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (stating
that "statutory evidence supporting registration-on-application interpretation is found in 17 U.S.C.
5 408(a)"); see also Datate, 2005 WL 1668020, at *9 (concluding that receipt of a response from the
Copyright Office was not necessary for the court to entertain the plaintiff's claim immediately prior
to quoting § 408(a)).
180See Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (E.D.
Va. 1989) ("Under the copyright laws, copyright registration is presumed to have occurred from the
moment the owner of the copyrightable material delivers his application and filing fee [and deposit]
to the copyright office. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a).").
181See supra text accompanying note 137 (quoting the relevant portion of § 410(a)).
182See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
171
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"could be read to apply only to the requirements for issuance of a registration
' 83
certificate, not to the requirements for instituting an action for infringement.'
Thus, although these courts find review by the Copyright Office necessary for the
issuance of a registration certificate, they conclude that such review is not a
precondition to the accomplishment of registration sufficient to confer subjectmatter jurisdiction.' 4
Section 410(d)1 5 is also focused on by application-approach courts.16 One
application-approach court declared that the "plain language of this statutory
provision suggests that the registration occurs on the day the Copyright Office
receives all of the necessary application materials."'8 7 Regarding "the metaphysical
debate over the time of a registration's 'conception,' , 8 8 that court disagreed with
"the statutory reading [of § 410(d)] propounded in" a pair of issuance-approach
court opinions.'8 9 In support of its view, the court noted that the contrary "gloss
ignores the statute's mandate that the merits of the application materials are 'later
determined,' that is, determined at some time after the right to sue comes into

s Iconbazaar 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
See id.; see also Secure Servs. Tech., 722 F. Supp. at 1364 ("Copyright laws make a distinction

184

between copyright registration and receiving from the Copyright Office a certificate of
registration.").
185 See supra text accompanying note 147 (quoting § 410(d)).
'
See Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 994 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting § 410(d) and declaring
that "[t]hus, Plaintiff can satisfy the § 411(a) requirement by merely filing an application for
registration with the Copyright Office"); see also Tang v. Hwang, 799 F. Supp. 499, 502-03 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (citing § 410(d) and declaring that § 411(a) "has been broadly construed to allow for the
commencement of an infringement action upon the Copyright Office's receipt of the application,
the required numbers of copies of the work, and the filing fee in proper form').
187 Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003); see also Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v.
Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 912 n.4 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Patry's approach would
place the internally created procedures of the Register above the clear statutory language of 17 U.S.C.
410(d)."). In the latter case, the SebastianInt'/court was referring to a critique put forth in Latman's
The CopjtightLaw concerningApp Bare/Prods.,Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984), which was
the initial appeals court decision construing the Copyright Act of 1976 in favor of registration upon
application. The critique describedAppe Barrlas"misconstru[ing] § 410(d) which is a housekeeping
provision" and declared that "the Copyright Office's procedure for special handling[, a procedure
for expedited processing,] would be completely superfluous if the Apple Barr/court's interpretation
of § 411 (a) were correct." WILIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAw 184 n.44 (6th ed.
1986).
lS Foraste, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 77 n.10.
189 Id (citations omitted). The Foraste court described the other two courts as "interpret[ing]
§ 410(d) to mean that registration is consummated only after an application is examined, considered,
and accepted by the Copyright Office, and is then 'backdated' to the time the application is
received." Id
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being."' 190 Thus, application-approach courts readily construe § 410(d) "to say that
191
registration is complete upon application."'
c. Section 411. Lastly, some application-approach courts have focused on
the second clause of § 411(a). 92 One of those courts concluded that "[tihis
statutory language... suggests that failure to obtain copyright registration [more
precisely, a registration certificate or refusal of the same] does not bar an applicant
from instituting a copyright infringement action."' 93 Accordingly, this court
appeared to suggest that the refusal of registration, which is required in order for
a copyright owner to be "entitled to institute an action for infringement,""' can
occur as a result of either an affirmative denial following examination or an
implicit denial that exists so long as review and an express decision by the
Copyright Office is pending. The corresponding result of such an interpretation
is that the first clause of § 411 (a) "confirms that it is the submission of an
application, deposit, and fee (rather than the issuance vel non of a registration
95
certificate) that triggers registration for purposes of conferring standing to sue."'
With regard to the text of the Copyright Act, application-approach courts
distinguish between the occurrence of copyright registration and the issuance of
a registration certificate.'96 Although issuance of the latter may be sufficient to
inicats copy.g.,
itis not necessary in the view of these courts.
Instead, the statute is construed as providing for registration upon receipt by the
Copyright Office of an application for copyright registration (along with the
appropriate deposit and fee). Thus, "application [is]
the jurisdictionally critical
event."' 97 Accordingly, once this act has been accomplished, applicationapproach courts conclude that they are competent to entertain copyright
infringement claims.
2. Underlying Poig Considerations. Although the text of the Copyright Act
serves as the touchstone, the application approach is complemented by policy
considerations underlying the Copyright Act.'" As "the foremost treaty on

'9

Foraste,248 F. Supp. 2d at 77 n.10.

191 Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
192 See supra text accompanying note 130 (quoting the relevant portion of § 411 (a)).
193 Datatel, Inc. v. Rose & Tuck, L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 05-495,2005 WL 1668020, at *9 (E.D. Va.

June 17, 2005).
194 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000).
19 Foraste,248 F. Supp. 2d at 77 n.10; see alro supra text accompanying note 18 (quoting the first

clause of S 411 (a)).
196 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
197 La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204 n.9 (10th Cir.
2005).
' See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004) ("In

addition to direct statutory support, the overall statutory scheme governing the institution of
infringement actions supports the position that Congress intended for registration to be complete
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copyright law"' 99 declares, the application approach "better comports with the
statutory structure. ' '200 Upon examining the broader implications of enforcing the
Copyright Act, application-approach courts take note of the relevance of two
doctrines: equity2° ' and judicial economy.
a. Equiy. As an initial matter, advocates of the application approach note
that "a party who seeks to register may proceed to litigate the claim, regardless of
whether the Copyright Office ultimately issues the certificate, or by contrast
''2°2
Additionally, once the application and other necessary materials are
denies it.
submitted to the Copyright Office, "the claimant at that juncture has done all that
it can do."20 3 Thus, according to this view, equity would require allowing "a
copyright owner.., into court without being held hostage by the vagaries of the
Copyright Office in its ministerial act of issuing the certificate.", 2' As one
application-approach court put it, "otherwise, the owner of a copyright would be
left in legal limbo while the Copyright Office considers whether he qualifies for
a certificate of registration. 202 Accordingly, even an issuance-approach court
admitted that "[c]ourts adopting the Application approach plausibly claim that
their approach provides a sort of roughjusice because it allows copyright owners
to file suit while still maintaining the requirement that an owner obtain a
certificate before a court can invoke the remedies contained in Title 17."206
In and of itself, being placed in "legal limbo" is not necessarily unfair.
However, as a result of this inability to enforce their rights, copyright owners are
subject to harm in two respects. First, this predicament "allows an infringer to
dilute a copyright until a government official is able to sift through and approve
what is surely a large stack of copyright registration applications. 2 7 Additionally,
as the statute oflimitations for copyright infringement actions is three years 2 8 and
the "process of processing and evaluating a copyright application could be a
lengthy one,'2°9 a copyright owner may find enforcing his right impossible even

on application.").
' Id. at 633.
2 NIMMER, supra note 9, §7.16[B][1l[a][i].
201Equity is defined as "[f]aimess" as well as "[t]he recourse to principles of justice to correct or
supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (8th
ed. 2004).
2022 NIMMER, supra note 9, §7.16[B][1][a][i].
203 Id

La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,1204 (10th Cir. 2005).
2oSecure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (E.D. Va.
1989).
2
La ResolanaArhitects,416 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added).
'34

207 Id

See sapra note 10.
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
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after he re-emerges from "legal limbo." 210 As a result of these possibilities,
application-approach courts find their reading of the Copyright Act reinforced by
considerations of equity.
b. JudicialEconom. Once an application and other necessary materials are
delivered to the Copyright Office, the owner seeking to bring suit will ultimately
be allowed to proceed regardless of the Copyright Office's response.2"' Thus,
application-approach courts conclude that "delaying the date on which a
'
copyright owner can sue is a senseless formality."212
The cost of adherence to this
"senseless formality" is often the dismissal of a suit only to require the re-filing
of another complaint once the Copyright Office has issued a response to the
copyright owner's application.213 As the application approach avoids this
inefficient use of judicial resources by allowing suit to proceed upon application,
courts favoring this approach draw support from the principle of judicial
economy.
Application-approach courts draw on the "plain language" of the Copyright
Act to construct a logical argument in support of their conclusion. Additionally,
certain policy considerations underlying the overall statutory scheme strengthen
this construction; as one application-approach court stated, the application
approach "best effectuate[s] the interests of justice and promotes] judicial
economy."2 14 Accordingly, these courts view registration as being effected upon
receipt by the Copyright Office of an application for copyright registration (along
with a deposit and fee). Thus, in their view, once this event occurs, courts are
competent to entertain copyright infringement claims.
IV.

DISCUSSION

As the present state of affairs concerning registration as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction is a product of historical inertia and offers little in terms of
consistency and notice, the most appropriate response to the present circuit split

210 Id.

211See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
212La ResolanaArchitects, 416 F.3d at 1203; see also Iconbazaar,308

F. Supp. 2d at 633 ("[D]elaying
the institution of a civil action in order to determine whether the copyright will be approved is
unnecessary because the owner of the work may bring suit even if his copyright application is
denied.").
213See, e.g., Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873 FMS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, at *8(N.D.
Cal.June 15,1998) (dismissing certain plaintiffs' complaints, but declaring that "the Court will [later]
hear argument on whether it should permit plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint to include
[those] plaintiffs.., whose applications have been approved as of that date").
214Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of North Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70,72
(D.D.C. 2000).
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is the widespread adoption of the application approach by the federal judiciary.
The application approach is consistent with the text of the Copyright Act.
Furthermore, not only will the adoption of this approach better serve the
purposes of copyright law than the status quo, but the most significant costs of
abandoning the issuance approach can also be easily remedied.
General considerations of fairness weigh against conditioning copyright
protection on registration because the costs of that condition to copyright owners
outweigh the benefits to the public arising from the Copyright Office's review of
copyright application materials. Under the application approach, the Register of
Copyrights, as a practical matter, will have sufficient time to evaluate an
application and intervene in court if desired. Finally, as a copyright owner is
entitled to bring suit in court regardless of registration or refusal and the
evaluation of an application for copyright by the Copyright Office is a cursory
process, logical consistency favors the substantive exercise of rights over the
exercise of form devoid of purpose.
A. LITTLE WILL BE LOST BY ABANDONING THE STATUS QUO AND EVEN LESS
WOULD BE GAINED BY RETAINING IT

Both the application and issuance approaches essentially satisfy the purposes
of copyright law with respect to the general public and individual authors.
Regarding the general public, a certificate of registration is the most effective
means available for an author to enforce his copyright. However, having to wait
four or five extra months for a certificate21 does not result in a cost sufficient to
decrease an author's incentive to create. Thus, the public continues to reap the
benefit of authors' artistic creations and, consequently, a major purpose of
copyright law is fulfilled.
With respect to the benefits flowing from registration, submission of an
application and deposit are necessary under both approaches.216 Thus, the
Copyright Office continues to compile a public record, which increases
marketplace efficiency.2" 7 Additionally, deposits continue to be a resource for the
Library of Congress.2"' Although the Copyright Office's gatekeeper function may
be negatively impacted, a simple remedy to such involves the notification of the
Register of Copyrights of instances in which an application is pending

215 See spra note 59 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
27 See spra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
218

See spra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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concurrently with an infringement suit.2 19 If the Register desires to expedite his
evaluation process or to interfere in the litigation, he is free to do so.22
As for individual authors, they continue to reap a financial profit from their
creations. Furthermore, many authors may either be registered prior to
infringement in order to avail themselves of statutory damages and attorney
fees"' or, if not registered prior to the infringement at issue, opt not to bring suit
in the first place.' Thus, the choice of approach may be a non-factor in many
instances.
Although a copyright is conferred exclusively by the government's
constitutional and legislative authority and, thus, its characteristics may be defined
by such authority, 3 the origin and nature of such copyrights do not justify
arbitrary products of historical inertia. Nonetheless, the status quo is exactly such
a product. Neither approach is a result of calculated government action. Beyond
encouraging the Copyright Office's gatekeeper function, the issuance approach
serves no other underlying purposes that would be sacrificed under the
application approach.
Furthermore, the status quo offers little with regard to consistency or notice.
The two respective approaches are applied throughout the country without rhyme
or reason." 4 Thus, no means exist to predict what approach one is likely to
encounter. Consequently, litigants presently have little notice concerning what to
expect with regard to the prerequisite of registration." Therefore, the advantage
of retaining the status quo for the sake of future notice is insignificant.
Finally, widespread adoption of the application approach will generate
uniformity and certainty in the federal court system. Fundamentally, a
disagreement among the federal judiciary on the scale of the present split related
to copyright registration as a condition to infringement is to be avoided if
possible. As adopting the application approach is possible, the present split can
be remedied.

219

See2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a][i] n.38.23 ("[A]s a safeguard against the rare case

in which the timing might prejudice the Register's right to appear [to contest the registrability of a
work], it might be prudent for courts following the [application approach] to require the plaintiff to
file notice with the Copyright Office about the concurrent pendency of the application for
registration and litigation, so that the Register, if she chooses, could expedite treatment of the
former, and, if she denies issuance of a certificate, could appear in the latter.").
20 Id
221

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

See supra notes
m See supra notes
z See supra notes
's
See supra notes

85-89
51-56
12-14
37-40

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss1/3

30

Bracey: Searching For Substance in The Midst of Formality: Copyright Regi
20061

SEARCHING FOR SUBSTANCE

B. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS JUSTIFIED BY STATUTE AND UNDERLYING
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The text of the Copyright Act is consistent with the application approach. As
provided in the Act, the occurrence of registration and the issuance of a
registration certificate are distinct events.226 The former is a condition to filing
suit, whereas the latter is a condition to certain remedies and evidentiary
advantages. 22' Though issuance of a Copyright response may be sufficient to
establish the occurrence of registration, it is not necessary.
The application approach also furthers certain policies relevant to copyright
law more effectively than the status quo or the issuance approach alone. First,
adopting the application approach will increase authors' incentive to create.
Though the incentive remains strong at the present, it can only be strengthened
by allowing the immediate enforcement of copyright. Also, adopting the
application approach will eliminate an advantage for intentional infringers, who
are hard to deter. Finally, adoption of the application approach will conserve
judicial resources by avoiding the dismissals of copyright infringement claims only
to entertain the identical complaint a short time later following the issuance of a
response by the Copyright Office.228
C. THE APPLICATION APPROACH ISJUSTIFIED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS,
PRACTICALITY, AND LOGICAL CONSISTENCY

Fairness weighs against recognition of a copyright whose effectiveness is
conditional unless the satisfaction of that condition materially furthers the public
good.229 In the present situation, the Copyright Office's evaluation does not
materially further the public good. The evaluation is cursory and any doubts are
construed in favor of the applicant.23 ° Thus, allowing the Copyright Office to
evaluate an application at the expense of copyright protection is not justified.
Copyright owners are not "sleeping on their rights" by failing to register their
copyrights before infringement occurs. Registration as a condition to
infringement is more esoteric than the idea-expression dichotomy or the concept
that a copyright automatically arises upon creation.23' As many authors are

" See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
227See 2 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 7.16[B][1][a] [i]
("[I]t makes sense under the 1976 Act to refer

to appkationfor registration as a condition to filing an infringement action, whereas issuance of a
registration certificate is a condition to statutory damages, primafade presumption. ...
2).
2 See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 50.
230 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
231 See Perlmutter, supra note 75, at 573 ("Every copyright lawyer has had the experience of
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unaware of the latter two, it is understandable that they are also unaware of the
registration requirement. 232 Finally, even issuance courts readily acknowledge the
inequity of dismissing a suit in which a litigant plainly has a recognized property
interest that is being invaded.233
As far as practical considerations, ninety-six percent of applications are
approved by the Copyright Office. 23 Thus, the majority of disputes over
copyrightability are resolved in court regardless of the Copyright Office's
evaluation. Additionally, the normal four to five month delay will usually be
outlasted by the "languid pace of trial."23 Thus, the Copyright Office will often
reach its determination before a case is decided.236 Consequently, the Copyright
Office will be able to interfere in a proceeding in time to allow its determination
to be effective.237 In cases where the trial progresses quickly, the Register can take
advantage of being notified of the concurrent pendency of an application and
corresponding application and expedite the evaluation process if desired.238
Regardless of the Copyright Office's determination, an applicant is entitled to
bring suit.2 39 Additionally, the application is almost always found to be
copyrightable material.2" On the other hand, requiring an infringement suit to be
delayed for a few months serves no substantive purpose since the Copyright
Office's examination is essentially a formality.24 1 Thus, logical consistency favors
the substantive exercise of rights over adherence to a formality with no underlying
purpose.
Additionally, the distinction between a copyright and copyright protection is
without substance. As the Supreme Court bluntly put it, "[w]ithout [the] right of
vindication a copyright is valueless." 42 This characterization is equally applicable
to the distinction between encouraging registration by special remedies rather than
by threatening loss of rights. Ultimately, the argument-a copyright can be
recognized by law, the ability to legally protect that right conditioned, and the
condition justified as it does not involve the taking of legal rights-is circular as

advising individuals who do not know the fundamental principles that ideas are not copyrightable
and that copyright vests automatically upon creation, let alone the more esoteric rule that registration
prior to infringement is a prerequisite ...
232 Id.
233 See supra text accompanying note 206.
234 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

23-2 NIMMER,-supra note 9, 5 7.16[B][1][a][i] n.38.23.
236 Id.
237Id.

238See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
240 See supra text accompanying note 234.
241 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
242 Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 40 (1939).
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it ends where it begins. Logical consistency dictates that a right that was not
effective in the beginning cannot have its ineffectiveness, justified on the grounds
that it was essentially ineffective from creation.
V. CONCLUSION

A copyright originates as a grant of legal recognition by the legislative authority
on behalf of the people. Although this certainly gives the legislature discretion in
establishing that right's characteristics, such freedom is not unlimited.
Nonetheless, this positivistic view of copyright law dominates in the United States
and, consequently, has informed the purposes underlying copyright law.
Although one intended effect of copyright law is to secure a fair return for the
author, the ultimate goal is to benefit the public. The requirement of registration
as a condition to bringing an infringement action is one means of accomplishing
this goal. As a consequence of registration, the public receives access to a
storehouse of useful information. However, as a result of the imposition of this
condition, the question of what events constitute registration takes on added
significance.
At present, that very issue divides federal courts. On one hand, some view
registration as occurring upon submission of the necessary materials to the
Copyright Office. In contrast, others consider the jurisdictionally critical point
to be when the Copyright Office issues a reply. Despite this split's failure to
drastically impact the general purposes of copyright law in a negative fashion,
action should be taken to alter the current situation.
To that end, the application approach should be adopted by the federal courts.
First of all, the status quo is an arbitrary product of historical inertia rather than
calculated policy decisions. Thus, there is little to be gained by maintaining the
status quo and even less to lose by abandoning it.
Apart from the insignificance of the status quo, the application approach is
justified by the text of the Copyright Act. In addition, that approach better serves
the purposes of copyright law than the present situation or the issuance approach
alone. Finally, considerations of fairness, practicality, and logical consistency all
weigh in favor of this approach. Therefore, the federal courts should adopt the
application approach as the standard by which they determine if a copyright
owner has registered his copyright, and, thus, satisfied the condition governing
the courts' exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over copyright infringement
claims.
MOSE BRACEY
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